Bangsamoro Basic Law Pdf Free Download

The book examines the changing pattern power configuration and alignment in the making and unmaking of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) -- proposed law to govern the expanded Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines. It captures the politics behind the law. It argues that the BBL tries to address the secessionist movement but the limits of the law remain insufficient to fully answer the fundamental quest of Muslims to the right to self-determination.

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Yuchengco Center

De La Salle University

Manila

The Politics of the

Bangsamoro Basic Law

Dr. Rizal G. Buendia

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic

Law

Dr. Rizal G. Buendia

Yuchengco Center

by the Yuchengco Center

Prepared by Jeffrey P. Bernido

Photos on cover retrieved from: (center image)

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/01/29/philippines-can-peace-mindanao-ever-

achieved/; (back cover) http://static8.bigstockphoto.com/thumbs/2/7/4/small2/4723478.jpg

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transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including

photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system,

without the permission in writing from the Center.

The views expressed by the authors in this publication do not reflect those of

the Trustees and Officers of the Yuchengco Center.

Please address all inquiries to:

Yuchengco Center

2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco Hall

De La Salle University

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Philippines

E-mail: yuchengcocenter@dlsu.edu.ph

Fax: (632) 525-3457

URL: http://yc.dlsu.edu.ph

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations and tables

The BBL: Brief Background and Current State

Saving the BBL and the debate

The Bangsa Moro and Philippine Nation State

The right to self-determination

The creation and re-creation of the Bangsa Moro and

Bangsamoro Identity

The politics of BBL and power distribution

Yuchengco Center

List of Abbreviations

Ad Hoc Committee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

Bangsamoro Autonomous Region

Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region

Bangsa Moro Islamic Liberation Organisation

Bangsa Moro Liberation Organisation

Bangsamoro Transition Commission

Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro

Civil Society Organization

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

Countries and Peoples

Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

Government of the Philippines

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural

Rights

International Court of Justice

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Moro National Liberation Front

Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain

National Bureau of Investigation

Non-Govermental Organization

National Islamic Command Council

National Prosecution Service

Organization of Islamic Conference

Philippine National Police

Senate of the Philippines

Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

Dr. Rizal G. Buendia

Introduction

The Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) otherwise known as the Basic Law

for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, also referred to as the Batayang

Batas para sa Rehiyong Awtonomo ng Bangsamoro in Filipino has become a

contentious political issue. This is not only because of the controversial

provisions pertinent to the concepts of constitutionalism but also, and more

importantly, on the complex political repercussions it will generate in

defining the future of Muslim secessionist movement in the Philippines – the

longest armed separatist movement in Southeast Asia and most serious

threat to the cou ntry's political stability.

The political complexity of the BBL lies not merely on its conformity

or non-conformity with the legal requirements of the Constitution. Neither is

it the satisfaction nor non-satisfaction of the demands and aspirations of the

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in which the government had forged a

peace agreement. The political intricacies of the law rest on its capability to

conclusively address the long-standing armed conflict of Moro secessionism

and substantial political autonomy claimed by key Muslim political

organizations which have historically participated and struggled to realize

their right to self-determination. Hence, the important role played by the

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the 1960s cannot be ignored and

overestimated in spite of ceasing its armed struggle in 1996. Although some

other Muslim armed groups emerged in the process of advancing the cause

of Muslim independence and autonomy, their participation had been either

short-lived or historically less significant compared to the MNLF and the

MILF.

It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to unravel the

crucial political issues behind the crafting of the BBL and examine the

political dynamics between and among the main actors who performed vital

Rizal G. Buendia, PhD is Independent Consultant/Researcher in Southeast Asian

Politics and International Development based in London, United Kingdom. He is

former Chair of the Political Science Department, De La Salle University-Manila, and

Teaching Fellow in Politics at the Department of Politics and International Studies

and Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies

(SOAS), University of London.

Yuchengco Center

roles in shaping the political configuration of Muslim movement for self-rule

and governance. Rather than exploring the legal implications of the BBL

which shall be left for the Legislature and Supreme Court to decide, it shall

instead probe the strategic political repercussions of the proposed law in

addressing the fundamental quest of the Muslim minorities for self-

determination as well as analyse the draft BBL's impact in resolving armed

conflict and fostering peace in a multi-cultural society in the Philippines.

The BBL: Brief Background and Current State

The Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is the culmination of 18 years of on-

and-off and violence-interrupted peace negotiations between the MILF and

government of the Philippines (GRP) that claimed tens of thousands lives

and displaced millions of people. The recommended law which is currently

under deliberation in both chambers of the Philippine Congress is founded

on the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)

and the

Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)

signed between the

Philippine government and the MILF on 15 October 2012 and 27 March 2014

respectively.

Grounded on the CAB as the MILF-GRP final peace agreement under

the presidency of Benigno Aquino III, an earlier version was forged between

the government and the MNLF in 1996 under President Fidel Ramos that led

the MNLF to relinquish its armed struggle and mounted Muslim autonomy

within the framework of the Philippine nation-state.

This eventually

resulted in the integration of MNLF within the government's national

structure of governance after an uncontested election of Nur Misuari

(MNLF's Chairman) as third Governor (1996 -2001) of the Autonomous

Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), one of the two autonomous regions

created under the 1987 Constitution (Art 10, Sec. 18)

. In concurrent

capacity, Misuari chaired the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and

Development (SPCPD)

and its Consultative Assembly apart from b eing the

ARMM Governor.

The presence of two (2) diverse "final" peace agreements forged

between two separate Muslim armed groups and two different Presidents in

less than two decades does not seem to conclude the political settlement of

conflict in southern Mindanao given the dissatisfaction of some Muslim

groups regarding proposed law. For instance and notwithstanding the three

(3) factions within the ranks of the MNLF, two (2) factions censured the BBL

as a violation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA), while the other

faction supports the BBL. In the case of former MNLF Chair Nur Misuari,

decried the BBL as farce not only because of the failure of the government to

fully implement the provisions of the 1996 FPA

but also due to the non-

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

participation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)

in facilitating

the peace agreement (Mallari 2015).

Habib Jujahab Hashim's faction, the MNLF National Islamic

Command Council (NICC),

likewise opposed the BBL as it will effectively

"abrogate" the 1996 FPA (Pareῆo 2015) and "repeal the ARMM in favour of

the Bangsamoro region" contemplated in the proposed law (Marcus 2015).

However, its third faction chaired by Abul Khayr Alonto

urged the

Philippine Congress to "pass the BBL… and stand together with the MILF"

(Dioquino 2015). On the other hand a splintered group of the MILF, the

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)

opposed the GRP-MILF

agreement and the BBL. Similar to the MNLF's Misuari and Hashim factions,

BIFF opted to secure Muslim independence through armed struggle rather

MILF's version of autonomy.

Brushing aside, short of undervaluing the ideological and

organizational differences among different armed Muslim groups, Aquino

pursued to seal a peace agreement with the MILF; the administration's

centrepiece peace program in Mindanao. As a constitutional requirement,

Aquino submitted the draft law to Congress (House of Representatives

[HOR] and the Senate of the Philippines [SOP]) leaders on 10 September 2014

for appropriate endorsement. In the HOR, the draft law was tabled for

examination and debate as House Bill (HB) No. 4994 while in the SOP, it was

ascribed as Senate Bill (SB) No. 2408.

Mamasapano incident

The Mamasapano incident

abruptly suspended Congress's

deliberation on the BBL, four (4) months after it was bequeathed to the

lawmakers. The incident resulted in the death of around 70 people (44

members of the Philippine National Police [PNP] elite Special Action Forc e

[SAF], 18 MILF fighters, 5 members of the BIFF, and some other civilians) on

25 January 2015. A PNP-SAF mission intended to serve arrest warrants to

two high-ranking Jemaah Islamiyah-affiliated terrorists (Zulkifli Abdhir [also

known as Marwan] and Abdul Basit Usman) led to an unexpected clash

between government and MILF troops on the ground; an unfortunate event

caused the Philippine Congress to halt the discussion on the BBL hence

effectively endangered the peace process and conclusion of the GRP-MILF

peace agreement.

The Mamasapano episode polarized Philippine society into several

fissures. Self-declared pundits, political analysts/scientists, and opinion

writers were quick to make commentaries and "analyses" on the

Mamasapano encounter soon after it was brought to public attention.

Likewise, some civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental

Yuchengco Center

organizations (NGOs) interpreted the bloody encounter based on their

ideological, political, and organizational orientations. Expectedly, politicians

and government officials viewed the fateful event based on their limited

political interests and plans for the next elections, while some bloggers,

journalists, and columnists had theirs on the basis of which side of the

political fence they are protecting and benefitting from.

"Fact-finding" missions produced regrettably different facts and

conclusions. The Philippine National Police (PNP) Board of Inquiry accused

the MILF, BIFF, and private armed groups (PAGs) as culprits and placed the

duty of identifying the particular assailants to the Department of Justice (BOI

2015). Subsequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the

filing of criminal charges to 90 members of the MILF, BIFF, and PAGs for the

death of 35 of 44 PNP commandos (Merueῆas 2015). For the remaining nine

(9) others, DOJ's investigating teams (National Bureau of Investigation [NBI]

and National Prosecution Service [NPS]), found no suspects thus no case will

be filed to anyone (Viray 2015; Aning 2015). Despite these findings, Aquino

admitted that no convictions can be made nor the Mamasapano case be

resolved until his term ends in June 2016 (Bacani 2015).

On the other hand, Senate's Committee on Public Order and

Dangerous Drugs chaired by presidential candidate, Sen. Grace Poe, who is

opposed to President's Aquino political party, blamed Aquino himself as the

sole "responsible to the deaths of more than 60 people, including 44 police

officers of the PNP Special Action Force" for allowing Aquino's friend the

then "suspended PNP chief Director-General Alan Purisima to be involved

in overseeing Oplan Exodus," (codename given to the Mamasapano police

operation) (Legaspi 2015). The MILF's Special Investigation Commission

reported to the contrary. The MILF "did not fire the first shot," but acted in

self-defense according to MILF's Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF)

chief Von Al Haq (Maitem 2015).

Markedly, reports were meant to serve and protect each other's

interests; those implicated in whichever report refused to accept its verdicts

for obvious reason. What transpired was a "blame game," accusations were

exchanged between and among politicians and organizations

("revolutionary" and otherwise) who cannot accept the responsibility for the

objectionable event. Focus has been on organizational politics rather than

getting the job done, while the grieving families of victims remain frustrated,

demoralized, and disgusted over the turn of events. The "facts," conclusions

and recommendations arrived at as well as the truth behind the killings were

politicized.

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

What is more appalling, which is most important, is the timing. The

bloodshed occurred at the period when the draft BBL is under consideration

by the lawmakers in both chambers of the Legislature. The BBL, chiselled out

for a year by government and MILF representatives through the Bangsamoro

Transition Commission (BTC)

after the final peace agreement, the CAB, was

signed, is now the victim of the Mamasapano conflict. In military parlance, it

became a collateral damage, after a legitimate police operation against two

high-ranking Jemaah Islamiyah-affiliated terrorists (Zulkifli Abdhir [also

known as Marwan] and Abdul Basit Usman).

Saving the BBL and the debate

In the attempt to resuscitate the BBL, facilitate its legislation, and sav e

it from shredding it apart further by lawmakers horrified by the death of

police commandos, President Aquino formed the Peace Council

on 27

March to design a National Peace Summit tasked to deliberate and review

the legitimacy of the BBL. Working on four (4) themes, namely:

constitutionality; form and powers of government; economy and patrimony;

social justice and human development; and peace and order and human

security, the Council concluded in its 27 April 2015 Report that:

"Overall, we agreed that the BBL is

overwhelmingly acceptable and deserves the

support of all Filipinos…The exercise has brought

home to us the conviction that the BBL should be

passed (by the legislature); that to set it aside now

would be imprudent and wasteful of previous

efforts… There is enough goodwill on both sides to

bring this agreement to its conclusion…" (Citizens'

Peace Council 2015, Cover Letter).

Nonetheless, the use of the nomenclature "Citizens' Peace Council"

was criticized by former Commission on Elections Chair Christian Monsod

as the poor and the farmers were not properly represented in the council

either in its cluster meetings and discussion or plenary sessions (Cabacungan

2015). A review of the 136 participants shows that most of them are clergies,

business people, former high-ranking government officials, academics, NGO

leaders, and an assortment of middle class professionals (Citizens' Pe ace

Council 2015, pp. 51-52).

In spite of the favourable endorsement of the Council, both chambers

of Congress have not been convinced of its findings and conclusions. At the

HOR, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Bangsamoro Basic Law (AHCBBL) was

formed, chaired by Cagayan de Oro Rep. Rufus Rodriguez, and drafted a

substitute bill known as HB 5811 or the "Basic Law for the Bangsamoro

Yuchengco Center

Autonomous Region" (BLBAR). The bill was passed by the 98-member

AHCBBL on May 20, by a vote of 50 in favor, 17 against, and one abstention,

contained 28 "substantial amendments" (Arguillas 2015), stripping "48

unconstitutional provisions" (Gorit 2015) from the original draft BBL

submitted by Malacaῆang on 10 September 2014 (then classified in the HOR

as HB 4994). The proposed amendments were likewise approved by the

House Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Ways and

Means which were endorsed to the plenary.

At the SOP, the original SB 2408 was revised and later known as SB

2894 or the Basic Law on the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BAR).

Chaired by Senator Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos, Jr. of the Senate

Committee on Local Governments, the substitute bill was submitted on 10

August for Senate's plenary discussion and interpellation. The bill amended

almost 80% of the original draft BBL, with 115 "major and minor" changes

(Rappler 2015). Signed by 17 out of 24 senators, Marcos argued in his

sponsorship speech that the Senate's version protects national interest and

reserves powers enshrined under the Constitution to the national

government. Further, he stated:

"The basic law addresses the first and most

important prerequisite to peace – the definitive

end to armed conflict – by providing an efficient,

verifiable program of disarmament and

demobilization, overseen by an independent

monitoring body, and providing the needed

financial and social assistance to former fighters to

become peaceful and productive members of

society." (Mendez 2015).

The revised proposed bills, HB 5811 and SB 2894, have yet to pass the

plenary sessions of the HOR and SOP respectively before these are finalized,

thereafter consolidated and unified into a single draft bill (ironing out the

differences between the HOR and SOP versions) through the Bicameral

Conference Committee, and submitted to the President for his signature

before it becomes a law. However, given the limitation of time with the

primary concern of both chambers to prioritize the country's national budget

for 2016 before the end 2015 and the brewing local and national elections in

May 2016, it is highly unlikely that the draft bills will become a law at the

conclusion of 2015.

Moreover the Speaker of the HOR, Feliciano Belmonte Jr., admitted

that the low turnout of the 291 members of the HOR hence the lack of

quorum to make the deliberation on the proposed bill valid, impeded any

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

substantial discussion and debate. The HOR's Majority Leader Neptali

Gonzales II even confessed that a number of lawmakers were "purposely

absenting" themselves to derail any action on the amended legislative

measure (Rillon 2015). Marcos on the other hand, conceded that the

ratification of the legislature's drafted BBL will have to wait until the next

administration (Morong 2015). He further concluded that the "BBL is dead

and has no chance to be passed in the Senate and the House" (Gorit 2015).

Considering the drawn amendments made by both chambers of

Congress on the original draft of the BBL, it has been mangled beyond

recognition. The MILF opined that the HOR's AHCBBL version was "50%

bad" (Rappler 2015), while the Senate's revisions "severely revised the

original proposal… setting almost completely the original BBL, which was

crafted on the basis of the letter and spirit of the Framework Agreement on

the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the

Bangsamoro (CAB)" (Gorit 2015).

Lawyer Naguib Sinarimbo, a co-convenor of the Cotabato City-based

Bangsamoro Study Group (BSG) argued that:

"The proposed amendments change the

framework of the agreement of the parties on

changing the status quo and of redefining the

relation between the Central Government and the

Bangsamoro to a point that the Bangsamoro has

been reduced into the category of an LGU (local

government unit)." (Arguillas 2015).

Despite the almost failure of lawmakers to consider the BTC draft

BBL that was subsequently endorsed by Malacaῆang, MILF's chief peace

negotiator and BTC chair Mohagher Iqbal remains hopeful that the proposed

law, a product of "17 years of long, hard, and harsh negotiations" be passed

as it embodies the "solution to ending the internal armed conflict in

Mindanao and promoting peace and national unity among Filipinos."

(Abubakkar 2015).

The Bangsa Moro and Philippine Nation-State

Beyond the debate over the constitutionality of the BBL lies the

fundamental and deep conflict between two modes of building the

Philippine nation-state. This contradiction, evidently, is outside of the mind

frames of constitutionalists and legal experts to resolve. Neither could it be

addressed legally nor understood within the confines of existing statutes.

Addressing the political rather than the legal issue in building or busting a

nation-state is an essential question in politics. This task is relevant and

Yuchengco Center

important to comprehend the multifarious uncertainties and insecurities

behind the BBL.

At the onset, it is to be recognized that general concept of Philippine

statehood, i.e., notion of territorial jurisdiction, centralized government,

system of governance, and political relationship between majority and

minority peoples has been largely defined by centuries of colonial rule. The

state as a political embodiment of the community, requires a hierarchy of

institutions and structures as well as loyalty, discipline, and sacrifice from its

constituents to protect and preserve state's interests that go beyond and may

not imperatively coincide with peoples' culture and identities.

Since the post-colonial years the Philippine unitary state has worked

towards the integration, assimilation, and transformation of multiple ethnic

identities into a single national identity—a downward exertion of state

nationalism. A nationalism undertaken through the assimilation and

integration of minorities into the majority's culture, system of governance,

and socio-economic structure; a state's nation-building conceived as a kind of

super-ethnicity that supersedes all pre-existing ethnic identifications (in case

permitted to persist, they are considered as variations on the national

theme).

Hence, while nationalism proclaims the intrinsic value of equality

of people, the state compels them to succumb to the innate inequalities of

statehood. The nation-state does not reconcile the contradictions but hides

them.

State's nationalism is henceforth resisted by those groups who do not

see themselves as part of the Philippine nation. They feel strongly against the

erosion of their self-identity and see it as a gross violation of their political,

economic, and cultural rights. Sub-national independence movements view

their struggle as a type of safeguarding and defending their identity from the

political transgressions, oftentimes undue centralist policies, of the state. It is

a proclamation of the intrinsic value of egalitarianism, declaration of peoples'

right to live as a cohesive national community in accordance with their own

culture, religion, and belief system as a sovereign political entity, and

affirmation of an entitlement to statehood for the nation to prosper.

For the former, "nation-building" is the process of strengthening state

power while the latter sees it as the mode of empowering the "nation" to

create its own "state," thus a course towards "state -building." From the

statist outlook, the state defines the sort of nation it needs in contrast to the

nationalist stance that configures the state it requires.

Inasmuch as "nation" is an ethnical concept while "state" is a

politico-legal one, compound word "nation-state," a product of more than

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

200 years of European experience but a relatively new concept among de-

colonized countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, implies unity and

oneness of "nation" and "state." However, given the heterogeneity of the

world's population, having about 8,000 identifiably separate identities and

cultures in less than 200 independent states, (Gellner 1983, pp 43-50) conflict

and violence rather than unity and peace has characterized the relationship

between "nations" and "states." In fact, it is seldom that state's geo -political

boundaries coincide with the nation's geo-cultural frontiers.

In this context, the diametrically opposing standpoint between the

Philippine sovereign state and national liberation movements, either ethnic-

or religious-based, flows from the inherent contradiction in the idea of a

nation-state. The conflict generated by diverging perspectives has resulted in

spiralling and unabated armed confrontation, hostilities, and violence

between the forces of the state and separatist movements.

The clash of political interest seems difficult to reconcilable with the

former asserting its right to protect state's territorial integrity and the latter

upholding its claim as a "nation" under the principle of the right to self -

determination; rights that are equally valuable and recognized by the

international community.

The violent reaction of ethnic minority groups in general, apart from

the Muslim minorities, against these policies is comprehensible as they

endangered their collective survival. Accordingly, the undertaking to secede

from the state becomes an inescapable recourse on the contention that

separatists do not see a fair chance that their fundamental aspiration and

interest, i.e., to be a part of the nation, would be hitherto accommodated

under the state's political system. The issue boils down, basically, to political

and economic equity and social justice.

While state has, for a time, forged national unity, some of its

initiatives have triggered political and social conflict and rebellion. State

reform measures do not necessarily empower challenging groups but co-opt

them into collaboration within the state power system itself. These actions

undermined the process of nation building. The ossification of state power

unmindful of some fundamental interests and aspirations of groups or

communities engenders conflict. The contestation for power is further

prolonged as the state intensifies its centralism and uses its coercive force for

unifying purpose. As the state extends and deepens its centripetal measures

the more it is challenged by centrifugal forces.

Nonetheless, conflicts are not always zero-sum discords. Oftentimes,

they provide lessons for future settlement. The engagements of the state with

Yuchengco Center

politicized communal groups or movements have transformative effect on

the social and political bases of the state. They relate, interact, and affect each

other in a shared manner similarly renovating their respective autonomy,

capacity, and legitimacy in a political setting equally promoting and

advancing their institutional as well as collective interests.

The right to self-determination

The concept and definition self-determination is broad and

encompasses both external and internal dimensions. External self-

determination usually refers to the right of people to secede its conceived

territory from an existing state while internal self-determination concerns the

choice of a system of governance and the administration of the functions of

governance according to the will of the governed.

In both respects, self-determination is an acknowledged principle of

the basic human right of individuals to participate in democratic governance.

This includes the individual's right to engage in the political, economic or

cultural system of the state. Secondly, it is a collective right of groups as

national, religious, ethnic or linguistic minorities to express, practice, and

promote their own culture, life-ways, language, and religion which require

protection from the state. Thirdly, it is a right of people to their homeland

or claimed territory which embodies their identity, culture, and political

autonomy. Finally, the right to self-determination, especially the claim to

one's territory, has to enjoy the state's consent.

While people are entitled to their territory, this does not necessarily

extend to a free determination of the international legal status of the

territory. The right is bounded by the endorsement or rejection by the state

concerned taking into account the physical or geographical and

demographical changes that have occurred in the area that people have

"historical claim.

Nonetheless, the right of a group with a distinctive politico territorial

identity to determine its own destiny is the political translation of aspirations

in the demands for self-determination. Judge Hardy Dillard of the

International Court of Justice (ICJ), writing in his Individual Opinion in the

1975 Western Sahara Case, says that: "It is for the people to determine the

destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people" (ICJR

1975: 144).

One of the most vital reasons for people in exercising control over a

piece of territory is that it reifies power. Tillich points out:

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

"Being means having space or, more exactly,

providing space for oneself. This is the reason for

the tremendous importance of geographical space

and the fight for its possession by power groups.

The struggle is not simply an attempt to remove

another group from a given space. The real

purpose is to draw this space into a larger power

field, to deprive it of a centre of its own" (Tillich

cited in Williams 1988: 217).

Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the United Nations (UN) Charter have

embodied the principle of self-determination as one of its guiding

philosophies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states

that self-determination is not simply a principle but a right of everyone to

"liberty." The International Covenants on Human Rights—The

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) —

specifically provide in Article 1 of the respective covenants that:

"All peoples have the right of self-determination.

By virtue of that right they freely determine their

political status and freely pursue their economic,

social and cultural development." (UNHR 1978).

On the other hand, the principle of upholding state's territorial

sanctity remains an international norm. The 1960 Declaration on the

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (DGICCP) in

the form of a General Assembly Resolution is instructive. It confirms the

right to self-determination in relation to colonialism and denies some forms

of the right's wider application. It appreciates the inevitable tension between

the exercise of the right to self-determination and the parallel set of rights

associated with territorial integrity of existing and emerging sovereign states.

Thus, it reiterates Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR in its Operative

Provision 2 but at the same time qualifies such right in its Provision 6 which

reads:

"Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of

the national unity and the territorial integrity of a

country is incompatible with the purposes and

principles of the Charter of the United Nations."

(UNGA Resolution 1514, December 1960).

Provision 6 of the DGICCP culminated in the adoption of the

influential Declaration of Principles Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-

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operation Among States in 1970 as the UN General Assembly Resolution

2625. The resolution accepted the principle of the right to self-determination

that is linked to the notion of "equal rights of peoples" but cautioned that the

right shall not be construed as:

"… authorizing or encouraging any action which

would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the

territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign

and independent States conducting themselves in

compliance with the principle of equal rights

and self- determination of peoples … and thus

possessed of a government representing the whole

people belonging to the territory without

distinction as to race, creed or colour." (UNGA

Resolution 2625, 24 October 1970).

The assurance of territorial unity is now made contingent on the

government being representative of the whole people and institution of

fairness which pursues n on-discriminatory policies in relation to "race,

creed, or color," and full right to self -determination (including secession)

pertains only in colonial situations. It is intended and administered in a way

that is consistent with the territorial designs and administrative practices

imposed by the colonizers rather than the "people determin(ing) the destiny

of the(ir) territory " as Dillard assumes.

Dillard's dictum indicates that accidents of geography and of

historically established territorial divisions are not limitations to peoples'

collective free will and decision to shape their destiny. This presupposes that

if the formation of the state is a product of peoples' collective action, then

they also have the power and right to undo it. Hence by logical extension,

groups and peoples living within an existing state must also be able to assert

their will by deciding to leave it, carve a new sovereign unit out of an

existing one, or re-claim a state which had existed before the advent of

colonial rule or "modern" state.

Contrary to Dillard's maxim, peoples' will can only apply within the

political, not cultural boundaries that have been colonially demarcated.

Weller argues that:

"Self-determination is not aimed to restore ethnic

or tribal links among populations that were

artificially divided by the colonizers. Instead, the

'people' entitled to self-determination are those

who happen to live within the colonial boundaries

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

drawn by the colonial powers. Self-determination

action is taken in a way that does not fully

overcome, but merely reshapes, facts on the basis

of the reality of colonial administration. And it is

the territorial shape of that administration that

defines the self-determination entity, not the will

of the people" (Wellner 2005, p. 11).

The UN General Assembly Resolution 2526 (XXV) on the

Declaration of Principles of International Law proclaims that the principle of

equality of rights and self-determination of peoples cannot be interpreted

to connote the recognition of the dismemberment and fragmentation on

ethnic and religious grounds. Affirming the doctrine of territorial integrity,

ethnic, religious, and sub-national cultural entities and groups can only claim

territorial and political autonomy within the new state boundaries. Hence,

external self-determination is an act that cannot be taken up more than once.

When a colonial territory has exercised the option of independence, ethnic

groups living in the new state boundaries cannot invoke the right to self-

determination against the newly declared independent state. It is therefore

not a continuing action against the state.

An exception to this rule, as noted by Wellner (2005, p 29), would

relate to a self-determination entity that does not opt to become

independent but decides to associate, not integrate, with another state. In

such case, self-determination status of the entity is maintained or

transformed into a situation wherein the right to self-determination can be

asserted within the provisions of the state's constitution. However, there is

very little practice of this kind.

Since the early 1990s, the legitimatization of the principle of national

self-determination has led to an increase in the number of conflicts within

states, as sub-national groups seek greater self-determination and full

secession, and as their conflicts for leadership within groups and with other

groups and with the dominant state become violent (Griffiths 2003). The

international reaction to these new movements has been uneven and often

dictated more by politics than principle.

Self-determination movements remain strong in some areas of the

world. Some areas possess de facto independence, such as Taiwan, North

Cyprus, Kosovo, and South Ossetia whose independence is disputed by one

or more major states. Significant movements for self-determination also

persist for locations that lack de facto independence, such as Kurdistan,

Balochistan, Chechnya, and the State of Palestine.

Yuchengco Center

Evidently, there are two main views pulling in opposite directions in

the literature on self-determination. The first is the more restrictive which

limits the exercise of the right to self- determination within the confines of

the territorial jurisdiction of existing states; the right cannot be invoked if the

territorial unity of the state will be transgressed. The second is expansionary

which acknowledges and, to varying degrees, validates state-busting practice

in a reformulated legal approach. The latter view takes due note of the

degree to which non- sovereign territories of the Soviet Union (12 out of 15

republics seceded from the former USSR), Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia

were given diplomatic recognition and admitted to the UN as sovereign

states, i.e. Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and Kosovo of the former Yugoslavia; and the Czech Republic

and Slovakia of the former Czechoslovakia.

The controversy on the principle and right to self-determination has

led peoples and states to armed conflict. Struggles for autonomy and

secession on the defense of peoples' national rights are politically and

militarily confronted by the state, invoking its right to protect the

inviolability of its territory. Peoples of the world are told they have the right

to self-determination. Nevertheless, if this right is suppressed by a sovereign

state, the international community supports territorial integrity until a war of

independence is successful. As in the past, the entire problem is settled on

the battlefield. The conflict has been the source of tremendous human

suffering and destruction in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The creation and re-creation of the Bangsa Moro and Bangsamoro identity

The quest of Muslims in the Philippines to exercise their right to self-

determination is no different from what has been happening in the rest of the

world. The quest to create their own sovereign state is hinged on their

continued definition and re-definition of their identity as a "separate" people

from the majority of Filipinos in the country by virtue of history, culture,

religion, and way-of-life, among others.

The "Moro"

identity emerged and developed into a transcendent and

self-conscious Philippine Muslim ethnic identify during the less than half a

century of American colonial regime rather than the more than three

centuries of Spanish regime (Saleeby cited in Mc Kenna 1998; Gowing 1983;).

Markedly, the promotion of American type of education and

institutionalization of public school system in the entirety of the Philippines

hastened the growth and formation of Muslim identity as Muslim Filipinos.

Likewise, the policy of secularization has led, to a significant degree, the

rationalization of Muslim political system.

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

In McKenna's (1998) review of US policies towards the end of

American rule, he says:

"… American colonial policies had the effect of

ethnicizing Muslim identity in the Philippines. By

'ethnicizing' Islam I mean to say that American

colonial rulers encouraged the development of a

self-conscious Philippine Muslim identity among a

generation of educated Muslim elite who were

otherwise divided by significant linguistic,

geographic, and, to some extent, cultural barriers.

It was an identity founded upon the Spanish

ascription 'Moro' (or Philippine Muslim), but, as

the term 'Moro' remained a pejorative among

Philippine Christians, the most common

alternative denomination became 'Muslim

Filipino,' connoting a Muslim citizen of the new

(or soon-to-be) Philippine nation." (p. 132).

The pursuit of Muslim to self-governance commenced in 1921 when

Muslim leaders of Sulu petitioned the US President that they be governed

separately from the Commonwealth and the forthcoming independent

Republic. This was followed by another petition in 1924 from Muslim leaders

of Zamboanga addressed to the US Congress expressing their desire that

Mindanao and Sulu be a territory of the US Federal Government or be

declared as a separate Muslim Nation in the event the Philippines be granted

of its independence (Gowing 1979, pp. 168-169; Tan 1993, p. 11). Both

petitions were denied.

The rejection of their petitions and inevitability of Philippine

independence after an American sponsored 10-year transition period under a

Commonwealth Republic led Muslim leaders to reconfigure their Moro

identity in line with imminent formation of the Philippine nation-state.

Muslim politicians tried to project the image of a unified and revitalised

populace in order to gain some power bases in a nation-state that will be

controlled by Christian Filipinos. Leaders declared themselves as "Filipinos"

and considered Moro— pejoratively associated with piracy, savagery,

slavery, treachery, amok (juramentado), and other negative connotations—as

a name that is unacceptable.

In the 1934 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1935

Philippine Constitution (used as the fundamental law of the Commonwealth

and 1946 Republic of the Philippines), several elected Muslim Constitutional

delegates, led by Alauya Alonto, called upon their fellow delegates not only

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to cease from calling Muslims as Moros but also to accept Muslims as part of

the Filipino nation. Alonto of Lanao henceforth declared:

"We do not like to be called 'Moros' because when

we are called 'Moros' we feel that we are not

considered as part of the Filipino people You also

know that the name 'Moro' was given to us by the

Spaniards because Morocco had been under the

rule of Spain like Mindanao and Sulu. So that I

would like to request the members of this

Convention that we prefer to be called

'Mohammedan Filipinos' and not 'Moros,' because

if we are called 'Moros' we will be considered as

enemies [of the state]." (Alonto 1935 as cited in

Abinales 1998, p. 49).

Although Islamic education from early 1950s until late 1960s was

geared towards the deepening of Muslim consciousness, it underscored the

value of "good citizenship" and emphasised the importance of political

participation of Muslims in the affairs of the Philippine Republic. Domocao

Alonto of Lanao, a Muslim member of the House of Representatives,

proclaimed before the First National Muslim Convention in 1955: "We need a

thorough spiritual rejuvenation … If we are good Muslims, we are

automatically good citizens." (MAP 1956, p. 31).

The quest for a separate Muslim nation-state was re-sparked less than

50 years later when about 28 out of less than 200 Muslim military trainees,

mostly Tausug and Samal from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi who were undergoing

guerrilla warfare training in Corregidor Island, were summarily executed on

18 March 1968 in what was known as the Jabidah massacre.

This time,

through a violent armed secession against the Philippine state.

The Jabidah massacre was perceived as the state's assault against

Muslims who offered their services to the Republic, but had been duped,

subjugated, and perfidiously murdered by Christians acting on behalf of the

state. Both Muslim political elite and traditional leaders have experienced the

contradictions in their hyphenated identity (Filipino-Muslim) and felt the

frustrations in their bid to be integrated in the body politic. They saw one last

alternative: to separate themselves from those against whom they were

judged unfavourably and in relation to whom they were materially

disadvantaged. They must proclaim themselves as "a new people."

(Williams 1989: 429).

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

The new Muslim intellectuals renounced their identities as "Filipino-

Muslim" and declared themselves "Moro" that denote the descendants of

unsubjugated and uncolonized peoples and claimed their homeland as the

Bangsa

Moro (Moro Nation) that has been "unjustifiably annexed by the

Philippine state" (McKenna 1998, p. 208). Apparently, the notion of Bangsa

Moro is quite new—less than 50 years old. It emerged only in 1968 in the

wake of the Jabidah massacre. In like manner, Bangsamoro identity is a new

political construct. Fr. Jun Mercado, OMI, expresses:

The Bangsamoro identity is a sequel to historical

struggle of a people… The meaning and shape of

the new identity continues to evolve as peoples

take stock of the struggles in the Southern

Philippines not only for identity but also for a

nation and a homeland…. While the MNLF and

the MILF have the major roles in shaping the said

identity, the peoples in struggle shape its

meaning." (Mercado 2013).

The massacre gave birth to the Muslim (later renamed Mindanao)

Independence Movement (MIM) led by Datu Udtog Matalam, then Governor

of Cotabato province (the biggest in the country at that time). Matalam's call

for "secession" came in the wake of political violence in Cotabato that was

then beginning to take shape as a Muslim-Christian conflict.

However, he

relinquished his idea of secession soon after then President Marcos co-opted

him and later became the Presidential Adviser on Muslim Affairs.

Other Muslim politicians and traditional leaders came together to

continue what Matalam had given up. Then member of the House of

Representatives, Raschid Lucman formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation

Organisation (BMLO) in 1971 but later dropped the name Moro, which

remains unacceptable to many of the Muslims. Instead, it adopted the name

Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organisation (BMILO) in 1984 (Jubair

1999, p. 152). Generally composed of Maranao ethnic group, the BMILO was

conceived to be the umbrella organisation of all Muslim liberation forces

(Canoy 1980, p. 27). The BMILO braced itself for a protracted armed

confrontation with the state in pursuit of its goal to craft a separate Muslim

state from the Philippines.

Nevertheless, the BMILO was not able to sustain itself as an

alternative to MIM when some of its key leaders tried to negotiate with then

President Marcos for Muslim Mindanao's political autonomy. This was

perceived by the younger and more militant BMILO members as a sign of

capitulation. The frustration and disgust caused by the leadership, by and

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large composed of Muslim politicians and traditional elite of Muslim society,

led Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim together with a number of young

intellectuals of the BMILO to bolt out of the organisation and eventually

established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in mid-1971.

Gaining lessons from the past Muslim independence movement

beginning in the 1920s, Misuari assessed that the failures of previous

movements were not wholly rooted in the callousness of the state in its

treatment of Muslim minorities and discriminatory policies that favour the

Christian majority but also partly caused by the "collaboration" of their own

Muslim leaders with the Manila "politico-economic elite." Hence, he

conceived a rebellion that has two fundamental objectives: to set up a single

independent homeland covering the 13 ethno-linguistic Muslim groupings in

the Philippines

; and to wage war against Muslim traditional politicians and

aristocratic leaders who cooperated with the state (Mercado, 1984, p. 160).

Misuari's vision of a secessionist war was emphatically secular in

orientation rather than Islamic. It is neither ethnic nor religious. Its goal is to

reclaim the Bangsa Moro, Muslims' homeland "unjustifiably annexed by the

Philippine state" (McKenna 1998, p. 208). What looked to be the state's

prejudices against the Muslims had found a national expression. Benedict

Anderson (1983) points out that "nation" is an "imagined community–

imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" where people "not so

much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (pp. 15 -16).

Ernest Gellner on the other hand, says it is more advantageous to set up a

"rival nation" when entry into the dominant nation is difficult if not

impossible (cited in Hutchinson & Smith 1994, p. 60).

The maiden issue of MNLF's clandestine newsletter, Mahardika,

stipulates the meaning of Moro identity and character of Moro struggle. It is

national in scope and covers what it imagines to be the confines of the Bangsa

Moro, neither is it ethnic nor religious:

"From this very moment, there shall be no

stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a

Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a

Maranao or a Badjao. He is only a Moro. Indeed,

even those of other faith [sic] who have long

established residence in the Bangsa Moro

homeland and whose good-will and sympathy are

with the Bangsa Moro Revolution shall, for

purposes of national identification, be considered

Moros. In other words, the term Moro is a national

concept that must be understood as all-embracing

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

for all Bangsa Moro people within the length and

breadth of our national boundaries. (Gowing 1985, pp.

184-185 [italics supplied for emphasis]).

Misuari transformed the epithet "Moro" into a positive identity of the

Muslims and symbol of unity and pride in the course of national resistance

against the Philippine state. The ethnicising of Muslim identity was a

consequence of the awakening of Muslim self- consciousness. The Moro

struggle is an expression of a "reactive nationalism," articulated by the new

and non-traditional counter-elite on a reactive basis, and resonates with

Muslim society which is undergoing some "crisis of self-confidence." It

demonises the threats of the state as the enemy and mobilises the masses to

take collection action against such threats. It has to appeal to an educated

Muslim middle class and is invariably populist, intended to induct the

masses into politics.

From the time the MNLF was organized in mid-1971 until 1975, when

it officially ditched its secessionist stance upon the prodding of some Muslim

countries (notably Libya and Malaysia) and the Organization of Islamic

Conference (OIC), the precise definition of "Moro" identity and vision of a

nation-state have been the subject of an impassioned debate among MNLF

leaders. The inability to resolve the issue, among other reasons, Salamat

Hashim (a leading member of MNLF Central Committee) deserted MNLF in

1977 and formed a rival organization, initially the "New MNLF" which

advocated for autonomy rather than independence, and later renamed it to

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984. The MILF made Islam as its

official ideology. Hashim challenged Misuari, a secular and nationalist, as the

rightful leader of the Bangsamoro. He chaired the MILF from its inception

until his death on 13 July 2003. Currently, Al Haj Murad heads the MILF who

hopes to realize Moros's vision of political autonomy and self -governance

through the Basic Bangsamoro Law under the Aquino administration.

Factionalism is rife within the Moro secessionist movement. It has

suffered no less than seven major splits from the time Matalam founded the

MIM in 1968 (Buendia 2005, pp. 116-118); a major breakup occurs every six or

seven years on the average. The latest was in 2008 with the formation of the

BIFF, bolting out of the MILF after having dissatisfaction with the way the

latter opted to pursue a peaceful political settlement after the Philippine

Supreme Court declared the GRP-MILF Memorandum of Agreement-

Ancestral Domain unconstitutional (The Province of North Cotabato vs. The

Government of the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183591).

Undoubtedly, more organizational rifts will transpire in the future unless an

all-inclusive peace agreement has been forged by the state with the multi-

ethnic multi-ethnic Muslim groups.

Yuchengco Center

Historically, ruptures in the Muslim secessionist movement happen

whenever the state accommodates some of the political demands or

acquiesces partly to certain grievances advance by a particular Moro

revolutionary organisation to the exclusion of other stakeholders. The

shifting loyalties and interests of leaders as well as their respective

organisational strategies and tactics is more of a response to the vagaries of

political priorities and constraints which the state presents. Likewise,

reactions have been based on the changing configuration of the state and

character of the regime that interacts with the Moro movement. Conceivably,

Bangsamoro identities have been formed not only through the processes of

self-definition but primarily according to the exigencies of power—the

demands for political autonomy and independence as a consequence of

state's domineering role.

It is also instructive to note that the three major rebel fronts that

contested state's power since the Jabidah massacre of 1968 correspond t o the

three main ethnic groups among more than a dozen of Muslim ethno-

linguistic groupings. The BMILO was generally composed of the Maranaos,

the MNLF by the Tausugs, and the MILF by the Maguindanaos. It was also

reported that Moro rebels prefer to fight with their fellow ethnic groups, e.g.,

Maranaos, Tausugs, and Maguindanaos, rather than to be with ethnic groups

other than their own (Gutierrez 2000). However, MNLF and MILF have been

denying that a feeling of enmity and hostility exists between ethnic groups in

their respective organizations. They continue to confirm that Moro multi-

ethnic fighters who are generally united in pursuing their particular

organisational objectives rather than divided by internecine ethnic identities.

Perceptibly, heads of major Moro organisations refer to the same

"national past," but the "national future" remains unresolved and blurred.

The internal debate over the envisioned Bangsa Moro and strategy in

achieving the vision of a separate state is far from being settled. The Moros

speak of different Bangsas. The erstwhile secessionist MNLF says the Bangsa

covers the 13 provinces (out of 25) and nine cities in Mindanao, Palawan,

Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi (as defined in the 1976 and 1996 GRP-MNLF

Tripoli Agreement and Final Peace Agreement respectively), while the MILF

declares that it shall comprise the geographical areas dominated by the

Muslims (six provinces [Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte,

Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sultan Kudarat] and the city of Marawi). Other splinter

groups have either nebulous or ill-defined territorial boundaries. Thus, there

is no single idea of Bangsa Moro's geographical jurisdiction.

Ethnic ties have emotional, psychological, and religious depths that

are not easily severed. These are human ontological factors which cannot be

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

subjected to authoritative controls; no amount of coercion or repression can

contain Moros aspirations to self-determination in an extended period of

time in spite of their difficulty to transcend their innate ethno-linguistic

identity. They were seldom surrendered to the imposing power of the

Philippine state. Hence, irrespective of ethnic identity, Bangsamoros

continue to search for their Bangsa Moro.

The politics of BBL and power distribution

As stated at the beginning of this paper, the BBL is another attempt of

Bangsamoros to exercise the right to self-determination through a peaceful

political settlement of armed conflict after the MNLF struggled but failed to

conclude it with the GRP-MNLF FPA in 1996. Similar but not the same as the

MNLF's interest, MILF seeks to achieve political, economic, and cultural

autonomy and freedom under the 1987 Constitution. A fulfilment of this

right is contingent on the recognition and protection of Bangsamoro identity

and conceived homeland.

The linkage between Moro identity and territory is intricately

intertwined. Nicos Poulantzas (1980), emphasizing the importance of

territory to the notion of group self-identity, refers to the "historicity of a

territory and territorialisation of a history" (p. 114) —a territorial tradition

concretized in the homeland. A territory by itself is a human construct which

serves as the material basis in defining and redefining human, group, ethnic,

and social relations. It is the source of one's social security, assistance,

dependency, sociability, and intimacy. It assures the continuity of culture

and endurance of collective memory of peoples. As such, the c oncepts of

space and territory are of extreme importance in ensuring the tenacity of

one's identity and survival as a people.

The absence of or restriction to such control may invariably threaten

the fulfilment of the peoples' rights and imperil their identity to a particular

territory. In this respect, the anxiety of the Bangsamoro over the future of

their homeland simply infers their lack of full control over their lives. The

right of a group with a distinctive politico territorial identity to determine its

own destiny is the political translation of aspirations in the demands for self-

determination.

Notwithstanding the ideological differences between the MNLF and

MILF, as well as with some smaller groups in the Muslim autonomy

movement, they see themselves as "one people." The consciousness of being

one people distinct from the neighboring peoples, the Filipinos, Bangsamoro

is articulated and self-ascribed, bound collectively on the basis of a

common ancestry, history, society, institutions, territory, and more

Yuchengco Center

importantly, religion; they are intractably united in terms of their identity

and sense of nationhood.

Identities have not dissolved and primordial interests have been

sustained. Although Moro identity is far from dense and vulnerable to

political manipulation either by the state or non-state actors as witnessed by

the formation of innumerable groups, some of them involved in criminal

activities, using "Islam" as their protective shield, they are welded together

by their common struggle to be self-ruled.

By and large, and as shown by history, Bangsamoros' quest for self-

governance and self-determination is fundamentally a question of territorial

rights. In war and peace, the issue of one's control over a physical space has

been the persistent bone of contention between the Philippine state and

Bangsamo independence movements.

The latest attempt of the MILF to push for a legal recognition of the

Philippine state of a Bangsamoro territorial domain prior to endorsing the

draft BBL was in 2008. Through the Memorandum of Agreement on the

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on

Peace of 2001, it pursued for the establishment of a "Bangsamoro Juridical

Entity" (BJE). Similar to the proposed BBL, it will supplant the ARMM and

include as many as 737 Muslim majority villages (barangays) outside the

ARMM as determined through plebiscites. Likewise, it laid out the possible

future inclusion of 1,459 other "conflict-affected areas." The expansive

territorial coverage of the BJE lies in its definition of the Bangsamoro

identity.

In addition, the BJE intends to provide greater autonomy than the

ARMM arrangement, which will have an "associative relationship" with the

Philippine government. However, the Philippine Supreme Court (PSC) ruled

that MOA-AD is deemed unconstitutional. In October 2008, the court, in a

split 8-7 decision, argued that the "associative relationship" is illegal as it

implies the eventual independence for the BJE from the state.

It contended

the BJE as "more of a state than an autonomous region" not allowed by th e

1987 Constitution (par. 5) for the ARMM governing body.

The PSC also viewed MOA-AD as a violation of the 1997 Indigenous

Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), which gave indigenous cultural communities and

peoples the right to participate fully in matters which may affect their lives

and destinies. By making "a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain,

without complying with the IPRA … respondents clearly transcended the

boundaries of their authority" (Supreme Court 2008, p. 38).

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

In this case, the MILF regards ancestral domain as the issue which

could give substance to the self-determination struggle. The government, on

the other hand, considers it a question that can be answered within the

bounds of the state's power and authority. This issue remains contentious

and arguable not only in the history of Bangsamoro struggle but also in

defining their future under the Philippine nation-state.

The negotiating panels' experience from the 2008 debacle led them to

abandon the use of "associative relationship." Instead, it used "asymmetric

(political) relationship" that links the national and Bangsamoro government

together. Pertinent to this, part of the proposed BBL's Preamble says:

"… With the blessings of the Almighty, do hereby

ordain and promulgate this Bangsamoro Basic

Law, through the Congress of the Republic of the

Philippines, as the basic law of the Bangsamoro

that establishes the asymmetrical political relationship

with the Central Government founded on the

principles of subsidiarity and parity of esteem."

(Preamble, Bangsamoro Basic Law) (italics

provided).

The relationship is further defined in Secs. 1 and 3 of Article VI on

Intergovernmental Relations as reflected in the following:

"Section 1. Asymmetric Relationship - The

relationship between the Central Government and

the Bangsamoro Government shall be asymmetric.

This is reflective of the recognition of their

Bangsamoro identity, and their aspiration for self-

governance. This makes it distinct from other regions

and other local governments. (italics provided).

"Section 3. General Supervision. Consistent with

the principle of autonomy and the asymmetric relation

of the Central Government and the Bangsamoro

Government, the President shall exercise general

supervision over the Bangsamoro Government to

ensure that laws are faithfully executed." (italics

provided).

Asymmetrical political relationship is a recognition of unequal

political power between the state and the proposed Bangsamoro

government. However, such inequality of power does not connote

Yuchengco Center

discrimination between two political entities but an acknowledgment that

they are simply different and distinct from each other especially in terms of

exercising political power. The disproportionate in power relations does not

mean inequitable and unfair power distribution either. It purports that each

political entity has to exercise power within their degree of competence,

capability, and expertise.

Given the imbalance in power distribution, the national and sub-

national governments have to employ and carry out its power based not on

the basis of equality but on proportionality. The concept of proportionality is

used as a criterion of fairness and justice. It is intended to assist in discerning

the correct balance between the function of the national and sub-national

units of government. As a constitutional principle and as a general principle

of administrative law, the principle of proportionality requires each decision

and measure to be based on a fair assessment and balancing of interests, as

well as on a reasonable choice of means. In other words, any action

undertaken must be proportionate to its objective, hence government's action

at whichever level must be no more than is needed to achieve the intended

objective.

Corollary to the principle of proportionality is the concept of

subsidiarity (see Preamble as quoted above). Subsidiarity aims to bring

governments (national and local [including regional]) and its citizens closer

by guaranteeing that action is taken at local level where it proves to be

necessary. It intends to determine the level of intervention that is most

relevant in the areas of competences shared between the national and sub-

national governments. In its most basic formulation, subsidiarity holds that

socio-economic and politico-cultural problems have to be dealt with at the

most immediate (or local) level consistent with their solution. The

fundamental idea behind subsidiarity is that a central authority should have

a subsidiary, supporting rather than a subordinate government which

performs only those tasks which cannot be accomplished or executed

effectively at a more immediate or local level.

The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity are the foundations

of asymmetrical political relationship between the Central and Bangsamoro

governments. It is in this context that the proposed BBL articulated the

"reserved powers"

of the Central Government (Section 1, Article V),

"concurrent powers"

of the Central and the Bangsamoro Government

(Section 2, Article V), and "exclusive powers"

of the Bangsamoro

Government (Section 3, Article V).

It should be noted however that such division and sharing of power

between the national and sub-national government is characteristic and

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

typical of a federal structure of government rather than a unitary state such

as the Philippines. Federalism denotes a system of government in which

power is divided by constitutional right between national and local units of

government in regions. Unlike unitary systems, powers of the local units of

government are both granted and withdrawn by the national legislature

inasmuch as sub-national governments are creatures of the national

government. In short, the creature cannot be greater than the creator, so to

speak. In contrast, under a federal system the local units of government have

their own independent constitutionally guaranteed authority. However they

remain sub-units of one overall state, and thus do not have national

sovereignty and have no standing under international law.

Henceforth, the asymmetrical political relationship which is based on

the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, between the Central and

Bangsamoro Government, that is akin to a federal set-up is a matter that will

be decided by the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the legal and

constitutional requisites that must be satisfied by the proposed BBL, the

political history and condition that led to almost half-a-century of struggle

for Bangsamoro political autonomy and self-governance need to be

considered in utmost importance.

Conclusion

As argued in the paper, the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law is not

simply a piece of legislative offer to the government. It is an embodiment of

Bangsamoros' historical struggle for self-rule; an exercise of peoples' right to

self-determination. Beyond the draft BBL to pass the legal and constitutional

prerequisites of the state, the political engagement of the Moros in another

challenging endeavour with the state has a higher significance in drawing

lessons on conceivable utility or futility of achieving political power within

the current political structure of government.

As the country's political history depicts, Moro conflict is sparked

and protracted more by the centralism of the state and inadequate

democratic space that limits the self- governing power of the minorities,

particularly the Muslims in southern Philippines. The tenacity and

seriousness of the conflict remains complicated with the unremitting inability

of the state to substantially and decisively address, over a long period, its

core causes insubstantial political autonomy; socio-economic grievances and

deprivation; and perceived injustice, discrimination, and alienation of the

people from the mainstream of Philippine political and economic

development. The issue boils down to political and economic equity and

social justice, the crux of the state's responsibility and kernel of nation's

spirit.

Yuchengco Center

It is essential therefore that Moros be politically drawn within the

domain of the state and make them feel that they are part and foremost

stakeholder of the Philippine nation. The sense of Moros' separateness as a

people can be altered or modified. Perceptions are neither fixed nor

permanent. They change as material conditions change; identities and

communal interests also change and are equally malleable and pliant as they

interact with the power of the state.

Yet, the process of reversing such outlooks and feelings of alienation

and transcending ethnic boundaries also demand a strategic approach of

sustained and indefatigable efforts and commitment on the part of the state

towards greater democratisation, meeting the new challenges of mosaic

democracy and heterogeneous development. It requires the state to redefine

itself and adopt an institutional framework of governance that would allow

the expression of democracy in kaleidoscopic forms.

The essence of democracy is violated when minority groups lack any

reasonable chance to take part in the policymaking process in government on

a more or less permanent basis without suffering from the "tyranny of the

majority." In other words, the rule of the majority or "majoritarian

democracy" in deeply divided societies is likely to be profoundly

undemocratic.

The threat of national disintegration will continue until an

appropriate institutional framework for political governance which can

accommodate Bangsamoros' social and ethnic diversity is ensconced. Apart

from re-engineering political institutions in Mindanao, there is a need to lay

emphasis, at least at the local level, on good governance, the rule of law,

improved civil-military relations, accountability of public officials for

corruption, and human rights protection.

Considering that striving for external self-determination would be

difficult, costly, and bloody, in spite of guarantees provided by international

covenants, the better option is to seek substantial and meaningful political

and cultural autonomy within the Philippine political system. While there is

no assurance that meaningful Bangsamoro self- governance would transpire

under a unitary system, new forms of co-governance may be tested to build

the Philippine nation-state. Conferring a semi-sovereign status resembling a

federal structure of governance to Muslim areas of Mindanao would be a

promising alternative that the state can work on to further the nation-state

building not only of the Philippines but also of the Bangsamoros.

A "unified approach" in brin ging together various ethnic, religious,

and national groups into the Philippine nation- state in general and

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

Mindanao in particular can be an auspicious politico- administrative

instrument in dealing with the complexity of living in a physical

environment where people of differing ethnicities, religious beliefs, and

cultures thrive and prosper, and conflicts are resolved and justice claimed in

a non-violent means.

Whether or not the state would be able to meet the challenges of

nation-building and national unity through the promulgation or rejection of

the BBL is difficult to surmise at this point. Definitely, there will be no quick

fixes and no shortcuts. Wounds that have festered for a long time cannot be

healed overnight, nor can confidence be built or dialogue developed while

fresh wounds are being inflicted. It is a process that requires special and

extra effort on the part of the state to guarantee human rights and uphold the

rights of people to their own development.

In the final analysis, modern governance is a matter of democratic

rule where multi-national people's sovereignty is respected rather than

trampled upon and stifled. It is a question where power is ultimately held in

the hands of the populace in so far as political leaders serve as

representatives of the multitude and political institutions as instruments in

advancing popular will for both the majority and minority peoples. If laws

constrict such expression and practice of democracy, then people have the

ultimate right and power to create more expansive laws that reflect the

aspirations and hopes of the nation-state. Failure to do so will simply

transform laws as tools of oppression rather than liberation.

Endnotes

The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) was a preliminary peace

agreement which called for the creation of an autonomous political entity called

Bangsamoro, that will replace the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM). It contains four Annexes, namely: Annex on Transitional Modalities and

Arrangements (signed on 27 February 2013); Revenue Generation (signed on 13 July

2013); Power Sharing (signed on 8 December 2013); and Normalization (signed on 25

January 2014). For details, see Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro, 15 October

2012, Malacaῆang Palace, Manila.

The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is the final peace

agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF that fleshed out the

terms of the four Annexes under the FAB, and included the Addendum on the

Yuchengco Center

Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation (signed on 25 January 2014).

Under the CAB, MILF agreed to decommission its armed wing, the Bangsamoro

Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). In return, the government would establish an

autonomous political entity, known as the "Bangsamoro." (For details see the

Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 27 March 2014, Malaca ῆang Palace,

Manila). Pending the creation of an autonomous Bangsamoro, a symbolic

decommissioning of the BIAF was held on 16 June 2015 wherein MILF turned over

75 high-powered and crew-served weapons to the Turkey-led Independent

Decommissioning Body and 145 members of the BIAF were decommissioned in

exchange for a PhilHealth (Philippine Health Insurance Corp) card that gives

beneficiaries access to nearly comprehensive package of health services, including

inpatient care, catastrophic coverage, ambulatory surgeries, deliveries, and

outpatient treatment for malaria and tuberculosis. Decommissioned MILF members

likewise received P25,000 (approx. USD 540.00) cash assistance each to engage in

livelihood endeavours.

The GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA), signed on 2 September 1996, laid

down the process and framework for achieving peace and development in Southern

Philippines. See 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (Manila: Malacanang

Palace Press, 2 September 1996).

The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao region was first created on August

1, 1989 through Republic Act No. 6734. It was officially inaugurated on November 6,

1990. The region includes the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and

Tawi-Tawi. In 2001, Marawi City (situated in Lanao del Sur province), and Basilan

province opted to be part of ARRM after a plebiscite was conducted on 14 August

2001. ARMM through Republic A 9054 is currently the law that governs the region.

The SPCPD was established through Executive Order 371 issued on 2 October 1996.

It acts as a transitory administrative arm under the Office of the President tasked to

promote development in 14 provinces and 9 cities (as of 1996) in Mindanao and Sulu

archipelago. The covered area is known as the Special Zone of Peace and

Development (SZOPAD). In the 2001 plebiscite, SZOPAD's coverage increased from

14 to 15 provinces and 9 to 14 cities as a result of the conversion of capital towns to

cities and creation of new provinces by the central government between 1996 and

2001. The dissolution of the SPCPD under Executive Order 80 of 11 March 2002

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

transferred all its on functions, duties, and responsibilities to the new ARMM under

Republic Act 9054. For details of the provisions, see EOs 371 and 80 and RA 9054 for

details.

Nur Misuari remains to face rebellion charges and has a standing warrant of arrest

for allegedly spearheading the armed incursion of the Zamboanga City Hall and

declaring the establishment of the United Federated States of Bangsamoro Republik.

The Misuari's MNLF on the other hand, accused government forces for disrupting a

peaceful rally asserting the implement ation of the 1996 "Final GRP-MNLF Peace

Agreement" and simply defended themselves from government's armed forces.

Known as the Zamboanga siege (9 to 28 September 2013), the conflict led to a series

of gun battles between opposing forces resulting in the death of hundreds of

combatants including civilians and displaced more than 100,000 people. See Medina

2013 and Rood 2014 for details.

The 1996 GRF-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA) has two phases. The first phase

covers a three year period after the signing of the peace agreement with the issuance

of Executive Order establishing the SZOPAD, SPCPD, and Consultative Assembly

(see note 5 above). The second phase involves an amendment to or repeal of the

Organic Act (RA 6734) of the ARMM through Congressional action, after which the

amendatory law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a

plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new autonomous government and the

specific area of autonomy thereof. Misuari alleged that the second phase never took

place as he was ousted from power by his own senior comrade- in-arms who form

the Council of 15. Misuari's Deputy Chairman, Hatamil Hassan was elected as the

Council's Chair while MNLF's Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, Parouk Hussin,

was elected new regional governor in November 2001. The Council proclaimed itself

as the legitimate Central Committee of the MNLF. This was eventually

acknowledged by the government and OIC's 10th Summit Meeting on 15 October

2003.

The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), founded in 1971, comprises 57

nations (including the non-state, Palestine) spread over four continents. It is the

second largest international body after the UN, and is aimed at protecting Muslim

interests worldwide and to settle conflicts by peaceful means, mainly through

mediation, negotiation, and arbitration. The OIC had been instrumental in forging

the 1976 and 1996 GRP-MNLF Tripoli Agreement and Final Peace Agreement

respectively.

Yuchengco Center

The National Islamic Command Council (NICC) was formed in the early months of

1995, prior to the conclusion of the 1996 peace accord between the GRP and MNLF. It

claims to have nearly 90 percent of the original 20,000-25,000 MNLF forces. The

military, however, estimates its membership to few hundreds. In its formation, it

declared establishment of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao through

"mutual destruction" (see Buendia 2005, p. 114 -115).

Abul Khayr Alonto was reported to have been installed as the new Chair of the

MNLF Central Committee on 3 March 2014 after allegedly ousting Nur Misuari as

Chair on 10 February 2014. The move was reported to have the approval of the OIC.

Alonto had previously served as the MNLF's first vice chairman before leaving the

organization for a time in 1978 because of opposition to Misuari's policies. (See Allan

Nawal,"MNLF reorganized with Alonto as new chair; Misuari out." Inquirer

Mindanao, 17 Mar. 2014).

The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), also known as the Bangsamoro

Islamic Freedom Movement, is an Islamist militant organization based in Mindanao.

It is a breakaway group from the MILF founded by Ameril Umbra Kato in 2008 who

wanted full independence after the Philippine Supreme Court nullified the

Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) of the Tripoli

Agreement of 2001 signed by the Philippine government and the MILF on 5 August

2008.

Mamapasano is a 5

class municipality of the province of Maguindanao where a

police operation, codenamed Oplan Exodus, took place to serve arrest warrants for

high-ranking Malaysian terrorists and/or high-ranking members of the BIFF.

The Bangsamoro Transition Commission is a commission created by the virtue of

Executive Order 120 signed by President Benigno Aquino III on 17 December 2013.

Composed of 15 members (8 members including the chairman from the MILF and 7

chosen by the government. The members represent the Christian, Muslim and

Indigenous People communities. It is tasked to come up with a draft on the

Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which would serve as the basis of a new Bangsamoro

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

political entity, in accordance to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The

BTC is deemed to be disestablished upon the enactment of a BBL. The draft of the

law was submitted by President Aquino to Congress leaders on 10 September 2014.

The Peace Council was convened collectively led by Manila Archbishop Luis

Antonio Cardinal Tagle, former Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr, businessman Jaime

Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Philippine Ambassador to the Holy See and Malta

Howard Dee, and founder of Teach Peace, Build Peace Movement Bai Rohaniza

Sumndad- Usman.

For more discussion on the relationship between nation and state, see Anderson

1983 especially pp. 66-103.

For more discussion see George de Vos 1975.

This doctrine is, however, displaced in certain circumstances, in cases of territorial

change that are anticipated in historical arrangements such as the hand-over of Hong

Kong (see Weller M 2005, "Self -determination trap," Ethnopolitics vol 4, no. 1, pp. 3-

28).

The term Moro was the name used by the Spaniards to refer to Muslim inhabitants

in the Philippines alluding to the Muslim Moorish occupation of the Iberian

Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) and the northern coast of the African continent in 711

A.D. In 16th century, the Spaniards encountered the ferocious resistance of Muslims

inhabiting the Southern Sultanates of the country in their attempt to colonize the

archipelago. This reminded them of their ancient enemy, the Moors, thus called the

Philippine Muslims, Moros. Hence, the term denotes a non-Hispanised Muslim

inhabitant in the "unsubjugated" southern islands, in contrast to "Filipino"

(collectively referred to as "indio" until 1872) which symbolises the Christianised,

Hispanised, and subjugated people of the Philippines. For an account of the

historical development of the Moro identity, see Phelan 1959 and Corpuz 1989.

Yuchengco Center

The official story on the Corregidor Incident had two versions. The first one says

that the execution happened in as part of the military's effort to contain "private

armies and armed separatist movements" plan to invade Sabah after they were

emboldened by the Philippines' position that Sabah was legitimately part of the

country. This was relayed by Maj. Eduardo Martelino, the military officer who

executed Oplan Merdeka (clandestine military operation to invade and re-claim

Sabah), in his testimony before the Senate and Congressional hearings. The second

version, as related by the lone survivor of the carnage (Jibin Arulu, a Tausug from

Sulu) revealed that the training was part of the Philippine Army Special Forces'

Oplan Merdeka. The massacre was uncovered by then opposition senator Benigno

Aquino Jr. Ferdinand Marcos, serving as President (1965–1986), charged that the

exposé was politically motivated and meant to discredit him. See Vitug & Gloria

1999, pp. 2-23 for details.

The term "bangsa" or "bansa" is a Malay word that usually refers to nations,

castes, descent groups or lines, ra ces or estates. The composite term "Bangsa Moro,"

refers to the "Moro Nation." MNLF and MILF prefer to use it as one word,

"Bangsamoro." For the purpose of this paper, "Bangsa Moro" shall mean the "Moro

Nation" and "Bangsamoro" as the "people" and "movement" that embrace Islam as

a religion and way of life especially those inhabiting southern Mindanao and

Palawan provinces and Sulu archipelago.

Violence involving Muslims and Christians escalated and plunged Mindanao into

a virtual war in the decades of 1960s and 1970s. Some analysts believe that this

violence between Muslims and Christians has given rise to the mistaken notion that

the so-called Mindanao conflict is a religious war.

There are conflicting versions on the founding of the MNLF. Jubair (1999, p. 150)

said that the MNLF was founded in 1969 while Mercado (1984, p. 159) noted that its

founding was in mid-1971. Interviews conducted by the author in 2000 among

former MNLF leaders who were then government officials of the ARMM declare 28

March 19 68, as MNLF's Foundation Day. The date was symbolically used by the

MNLF as its Founding Day since it was the day of the Jabidah massacre. Mercado's

version is closer to reality as it was in mid-1971 when Nur Misuari convened the

"Top 90" guerrillas (first batch of Muslim rebels who underwent military training in

Sabah, Malaysia) in Zamboanga City to repudiate the reformist tendencies of MIM

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

and BMLO leaders. This eventually led to the birth of the MNLF. Hence, 1971 is used

in this paper as the year of MNLF 's formation.

The 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic groupings are the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug,

Sama, Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kalibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawani, Molbog,

and Kalagan. Three of these are major groups occupying identifiable territories:

Maranao in Marawi; Maguindanao in Cotabato; and Tausug-Sama in Tawi-Tawi and

the Sulu group of islands.

The Court argues that the concept of association in international law is generally

understood as a "transition devise of former colonies on their way t o full

independence" (See The Province of North Cotabato vs. The Government of the

Republic of the Philippines, 2008, pp. 41-42)

Reserved powers retained by the Central Government are: 1. Defense and external

security; 2. Foreign policy; 3. Coinage and monetary policy; 4. Postal service; 5.

Citizenship and naturalization; 6. Immigration; 7. Customs and tariff subject to

qualification that the Bangsamoro Government and the Central Government shall

coordinate through the intergovernmental relations mechanism with regard to barter

trade and countertrade with ASEAN countries and regulation of entry of haram

goods; 8. Common market and global trade and; 9. Intellectual property rights.

These are shared powers between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro,

namely: 1. Social security and pensions; 2. Quarantine which refers to forced

isolation of persons suspected of having been infected by communicable diseases; 3.

Land registration; 4. Pollution control; 5. Human rights and humanitarian protection

and promotion; 6. Penology and penitentiary; 7. Auditing; 8. Civil Service; 9.

Coastguard; 10. Customs and tariff; 11. Administration of justice; 12. Funding for the

maintenance of national roads, bridges and irrigation systems; 13. Disaster risk

reduction and management; and 14. Public order and safety.

Exclusive powers are matters over which authority and jurisdiction shall pertain to

the Bangsamoro Government. There are 58 items under the list of exclusive powers,

Yuchengco Center

which include, among others, matters on agriculture, environment, natural

resources, land management, health, education, trade, manufacturing and public

utilities, establishment of government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC's).

For full list, see Sec. 3, Art. V. of the proposed BBL.

The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

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The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

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The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rizal G. Buendia, PhD is Independent Consultant/Researcher in

Southeast Asian Politics and International Development based in London,

United Kingdom. He is former Chair of the Political Science Department, De

La Salle University-Manila, and Teaching Fellow in Politics at the

Department of Politics and International Studies and Department of

Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),

University of London.

He obtained his Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree in Political

Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS) in 2002 under the NUS

by-research Ph.D. scholarship. He was a grantee of the TODA Institute for

Global Peace and Policy Research's Doctoral Fellowship Program and of the

Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program, Toyota Foundation

and the Japan Foundation Asia Center's research fellowship Program. He

earned his Master of Arts in Public Administration (MPA) with Highest

Distinction at the University of the Philippines-Diliman (National College of

Public Administration and Governance [NCPAG]).

Yuchengco Center

2nd Floor, Don Enrique T. Yuchengco Hall

De La Salle University

2401 Taft Avenue, Manila, 0922 Philippines

Tel: (632) 526-1253

Fax: (632) 525-3457

E-mail: yuchengcocenter@dlsu.edu.ph

URL: http://yc.dlsu.edu.ph

... As I argued in my previous works (Buendia 2005(Buendia , 2015, the linkage between one's identity and territory is intricately intertwined. A territory by itself is a human construct which serves as the material basis in molding and remolding human, group, ethnic, and social relations. ...

Rizal G. Buendia

The paper examines the challenges facing the Bangsamoro region. It attempts to explore the critical and underlying political and governance issues confronting the regional government in its quest to shape the Bangsamoro identity and unity hence lay the fundamental framework in realizing its vision of self-rule and self-governance and fulfilling its right to self-determination.

Rizal G. Buendia

The paper re-examines the Moro secessionist movement in the Philippines from the perspective of ethno-politics. Using a hybrid framework, which combines Paul Brass' and Abner Cohen's instrumentalist approach to ethnicity on the one hand and Michael Hechter's and Michael Banton's rational choice theory on the other hand, the paper argues that the complexity of the current separatist war is not simply due to the weakness of the state but also due to the weakness of the Bangsamoro identity and notion of nationhood. This frailty allows the state to co-opt leaders of the movement and sabotage their legitimate quest to self-governance and political autonomy. The reinvention of the Moro struggle towards self-determination refects another attempt to sustain the relevance of the Muslims' effort to create its own nation-state. However, the prospect of which is not promising. Addressing the confict in Mindanao requires not only the strengthening of the state but also the strengthening of the Moro national identity. Mutually re-enforcing these strengths can accelerate the process of Philippine nation-state building and establish co-governance mechanisms that would guarantee the unifcation of the country in spite of its diversity.

Benedict Anderson

'Imagined Communities' examines the creation & function of the 'imagined communities' of nationality & the way these communities were in part created by the growth of the nation-state, the interaction between capitalism & printing & the birth of vernacular languages in early modern Europe.

Marc Weller

This article deconstructs the classical doctrine of self-determination, asserting that it serves to disenfranchise populations, instead of enfranchising them. Accordingly, self-determination discourse is not likely to satisfy those struggling for sovereign statehood, resulting instead in prolonged and bloody internal armed conflicts. The article then considers new state practice that accepts the application of self-determination in the sense of secession outside of the colonial context, but only under the very narrow criteria of the new doctrine of constitutional self-determination. Finally, the article asks whether a new generation of self-determination settlements is pointing a way out of the deadlock that is generated through the application of classical self-determination rules.

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/294888285_The_Politics_of_the_Bangsamoro_Basic_Law

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